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Biodiesel. a diesel fuel substitute produced from renewable
resources such as soybean oil. has demonstrated potential
as a particulate matter and CO, reduction strategy for
I
transportation markets. Although not currently in commercial production or use. biodiesel is not a new fuel to South
America. In fact. research activities date back to the
1970s. As a result of the OPEC crisis, a significant amount
of research on biodiesel and ethanol was conducted by the
Brazilian government. However, the program was canceled before significant levels of research could be conducted. Concern over the
environment and the amount of energy that is imported on an annual basis, combined with global soybean marketing issues. have spurred the recent activities to
commercialize biodiesel in Brazil and Argentina.
?

Drawing from the US experience. various research, reguiatory and marketing
hurdles exist and must be addressed prior to biodiesel’s introduction and acceptance into any market. The National Biodiesel Board (NBB) initiated this United
Soybean Board (USB) sponsored program by developing an assessment for the
South American participants to complete. The intent of the assessment was to
determine issues which need to be addressed in order to introduce biodiesel into
the transit market in Brazil and Argentina. In addition, the NBB was responsible
for the following specific portions of the USB funded Mercosur Biodiesel Project.

J
J
J
J
J
J

coordinate fuel logistics
develop test protocols
train South American in-country managers for the project
ensure satisfactory fuel quality
troubleshooting for the project
preliminary examination of marketing issues for biodiesel use

The overall objective of the demonstration program was to collect reliable information that would allow transit companies and other interested parties to compare
the performance of buses fueled with a biodiesel blend to petroleum diesel fuel.
The NBB prepared a complete briefing book (see appendix II) for the in-country
managers and conducted a training session in the US the first week of June, 1997.
During this session, the Brazilian and Argentine managers were introduced to
biodiesei’s attributes as well as considerations for use. In addition to summariz-

ing activities of the NBB for the USB funded Mercosur project, this report addresses general marketing issues for biodiesel production and usage in Brazil and
Argentina.
Soybean production is a significant contributor to the Brazilian economy. In
addition, the majority of Brazil’s population resides in cities along the coast. This
concentration of people has created serious pollution problems in those cities.
Furthermore, Brazil is a net importer of energy sources and heavily dependent
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upon diesel powered vehicles to transport products. The
combination of these factors create an environment which
may be supportive of a biodiesel industry. With govemment support and proper handling of regulatory issues,
biodiesel could become a viable product in Brazil. Much
attention has been given to the level of government support
afforded in the Brazilian market, specifically in the State of
Parana. It should be noted, however, that while govemmental support is an important factor in the adoption and
implementation of biodiesel programs. it is not a primary factor for securing fuel
sales. The adoption of biodiesel as a viable fuel source will eventually return to
bottom line economics (what is the cost benefit analysis for biodiesel compared to
other alternatives which can accomplish the same goals?).
The conditions in Argentina appear to be different from those experienced in
Curitiba. Brazil. The primary market drivers for biodiesel commercialization in
Argentina are weak compared to Brazil. The compulsion to create biodiesel
markets is generally founded on one or more of the following elements: economic development; environmental improvement; and/or energy security. Of
these factors, only economic development seems to be of interest to potential
Argentine industry stakeholders.
In the Argentine case, if the environmental agencies begin enforcement of pollution limits then biodiesel blends will compete with compressed natural gas. If the
agencies do not enforce emissions legislation then biodiesel blends will compete
with the diesel fuel market. Given the strong level of interest from the agricultural industry, consideration should be given to including biodiesel into the petroleum infrastructure in low levels. This concept could be sold on the aspects of
economic development by a strong agricultural contingent.
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Biodiesel is nor a new fuel to South America. In fact.
research activities in South America date back to the
1970s. As a result of the OPEC crisis, a significant amount
~:L.
of
research on biodiesel and ethanol was conducted by
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--J
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groups such as the Brazilian government. The general
conclusion at that time was that vegetable oils needs to be
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esterified to be used with compression ignition technology.
1--r&,&zI.
However. the research program was canceled before
significant levels of research could be conducted. Concern
ever the environment and the amount of energy that is imported on an annual
basis combined with global soybean marketing issues have spurred recent activities to investigate the commercial potential for biodiesel in Brazil and Argentina.
The purpose of the program completed by the National Biodiesel Board (NBB)
was to coordinate fuel logistics. develop test protocols, train South American incountry managers for the project, ensure satisfactory fuel quality for the United
Soybean Board (USB) funded biodiesel demonstration project, and a review of
market conditions. favorable and unfavorable. for supporting a successful
biodiesel industry in Brazil and Argentina. The purpose of this report is to assess
the potential for a sustained Brazilian and Argentine biodiesel market. This report
will also provide a summary of NBB’s involvement with the South American
demonstration activities.
While the overall business climate appears to be quite robust in Argentina at the
time of this writing, there is currently no significant federal or state legislation, in
place, that could contribute to the development of an alternative fuel marketplace
founded on factors other than BTU (British Thermal Unit) based price-competitiveness. Argentina is currently a net exporter of both refined petroleum products
and natural gas. The recently-privatized state petroleum company, Yacimientos
Petroliferos Fiscales Sociedad de1 Estado (YPF), has become a symbol of the new
national economic success. This industry would have to be placed in a disincentive position for bio-based fuels to successfully compete. Although supportive,
the current agribusiness/farm lobby may not be strong enough to accomplish this
within the framework of existins government priorities and policies. Initial
research indicates that neither locally produced ethanol nor methyl-soyate could
compete successfully with the more traditional transportation fuels based on price
for BTU value. A focused agricultural lobby that harnessed all of the rural economic support and environmental benefits of biofuels, would still find success
politically improbable.
Xdding further complexity, there currently does not appear to be an organized
agricultural bodv capable of asserting the kind of political pressure necessary to
complete the basic regulatory and licensing procedures required. Even if support
was obtained, success will also be dependent upon acceptance by the petroleum
industry, specifically companies such as YPF. The government’s current economic strategy ties the growth of transportation fuel exports to the overall economic growth and vitality of the country.
Page 6

Brazil. on the other hand, appears to offer several opportunities for the development of a biodiesel industry. Without
taking environmental factors into consideration. Brazil still
exhibits two major drivers for the use of biodiesel. Energy
security is a significant issue in Brazil. Brazil is a major
importer of petroleum products; importing over 50% of its
diesel fuel needs. In addition, Brazil is soon to be a major
importer of natural gas from countries such as Argentina
and Bolivia. Brazil is also a major producer of soybeans
with an estimated 30 million MT crop to be harvested in 1998. By comparison,
CS soybean farmers produce approximately 70 million MT of soybeans each year.
The countries of Brazil, Argentina. and the United States account for over 80% of
the world’s soybean production.
Energy needs and biofuel production potential appear to be magnified in the
western states of Brazil such as Mato Grosso, Mato Gross0 de Sul, Amazonia. etc.
Consumers/farmers in these areas pay a premium for diesel fuel and soybeans are
normally discounted by RKYbag (60 kilograms) due to transportation costs. The
majority of the Brazilian population resides within 30 miles of the coast resulting
in cities with significant population thereby creating significant pollution. Regulations do exist in Brazil that limit the levels of pollutants from vehicles. These
regulations are enforced to varying degrees. Alternative fuel use is currently
limited. However, gasoline sold in Brazil does contain 23% alcohol by volume
produced from sugar cane. In addition, new rules are prompting the use of compressed natural gas and the recent implementation of the governments “green
fleet” program which is to operate on environmentally friendly fuels, demonstrate
a movement toward non-petroleum sources.
This report will provide some insight into the potential for production and usage
of biodiesel in Brazil and Argentina. Commercialization of a regulated product,
such as biodiesel, is an enormous task. It requires significant effort and political
support to establish a foundation for reoccurring production and sales. The USB
project has been a stimulus for biodiesel advocates in these two countries. However, commercialization will require additional activity and South American
resolution of several issues prior to biodiesel introduction and widespread commercialization.
Drawing from the US experience, research and regulatory hurdles do exist and
must be addressed prior to biodiesel’s acceptance by original equipment manufacmrers (OEM’s), regulating entities, and consumers. Prior to the initial trip to the
cities of Sao Paulo, Curitiba, and Buenos Aires, NBB developed an assessment
(see appendix I) for the in-country project managers to complete. This assessment
was used to define the major issues that existed. Although many research issues
have been addressed by US or European researchers, South American entities
prefer to conduct their own studies. Although demonstrations occurred in
Curitiba and Buenos Aires, some regulatory issues remain unaddressed. Technical acceptance must also occur before biodiesel will be accepted in these counPage 7

tries. These issues must
la.rse levels of consumer
Therefore, the regulatory
resolved prior to further
sued.

be addressed prior to stimulating
opinion/support for the fuel.
and technical issues must be
marketing activities being pur-

-‘q$~g;~“~
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The information that is presented in the following sections
should be considered a preliminary analysis of the market
drivers for biodiesel use and the issues that must be resolved. It is not intended to be a comprehensive market analysis or business case
study for the use of biodiesel in Brazil and Argentina. South American groups
that continue with the commercialization activities should be encouraged to
expand this work and develop a commercialization strategy as the next step in the
effort. Results from the demonstration activities will be summarized and provided by the ASA South American project managers.
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Brazil is currently enjoying a strong and growing economy.
It has been a decade since the end of military rule. Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso looks well
placed to win another six years in power in the presidential
election to be held next year. This is largely due to the
transformation of the Brazilian economy. Capital retention
.LC
$&
and foreign investment are up significantly, not surprising
since inflation has been under control for most of the
1990s. A vast privatization plan for government assets is
well underway and. in spite of strong protest from some sectors, so far has been
very successful.
For much of this century Brazil has been one of the world’s fastest growing
countries and now boasts the eighth-lar,oest economy. On the measure of GDP it
is in the same category as China and much bigger than Russia or India. Yet
Brazil’s consistent inability to perform up to expectations has denied it the recognition its size merits.
Most political scientists and socioio,oists feel that the core of Brazil’s historical
problem as an economic underachiever could be summed up in one word: inequalities. There are deep economic divisions within Brazilian society. Brazil’s
political parties are archaic and fragmented and the voluminous constitution
drawn up a decade ago to escape from military rule is so unwieldy that govemment officials can easily use it to protect corruption while blocking any attempt at
social change.
For awhile, during the swift industrialization of the early 197Os, it looked like
Brazil might become the first developing country to join the ranks of the G7 (G8)
countries. Then came the sharp rise in the price of imported oil, and the nightmare of a debt moratorium, hyperinflation and stagnation.
What has made a difference in the 199Os? The first big change has been the
sweeping away of economic protectionism spawned by military nationalism of the
1970s and 1980s. At 14%~~the average import tariff remains high by G7 standards, but it is low enough to give Brazilian consumers a taste for imported goods
and to have exposed many local firms to international competition.
The second change has been curtailing state ownership. All developing countries
go through privatization cycles, but most divest only token assets. The fervor
with which the Brazilian government divested Companhia Vale do Rio Dote
(CVRD) this last spring can be viewed as a measure of privatization sincerity.
But the third change is given most credit for the recent prosperity; Price stability.
In mid-1994 Cardoso introduced his real plan, named after the new currency. At
10% last year, the country enjoyed its lowest inflation since the 1950s. It is hard
to exaggerate the sigiificance of that. Brazil had tried to deal with inflation not
by attacking it but by seeking to live with it, through the world’s most ingenious
Page 9

system of indexation. Prices and wages were adjusted
weekly by Banco Central do Brazil It encouraged businesses to rely on accounting profits rather than actual
profits and. with half the work force outside of the official
economy, the inequalities became sharply worse. Additionally. not surprisingly, in a world of conveniently shifting prices, it allowed government officials to enrich themselves relatively easy through different accounting techniques.
The end of inflation has brought with it notable positive benefits for the Brazilian
economy. As many as 10 million people have been “readmitted to the ranks of
consumers”. Brazilian firms can plan for the longer term and can attract foreign
capital to modernize. Perhaps as much as 20% of the workforce has returned to
being paid in “over the table” wages. But, while there is no doubt that ending
inflation has helped Brazil in the short run, critics suggest that current government
policies are unsustainable.
The Real Program (designed around the Brazilian currency) is based on (1) a
strongly supported currency, (2) a conservative fiscal spending policy and (3)
lenient tax treatment for trade. In reality the real is probably overvalued which
means that imports are being sucked in at an alarming rate. The current account
deficits are huge: equal to 4-5s of GDP for 1996 and 1997. This is also at least
partially exacerbated by foreign investment in Brazilian CDs which will leave for
greener pastures as soon as interest rates climb elsewhere. Critics feel that Brazil
is headed for the kind of currency crisis that hit Mexico in December of 1994.
Supporters of the Real Program point out key structural differences between
Brazil today and Mexico three years ago. Mexico’s privatization plan had largely
ended. Short-term borrowed foreign money was being used to cover current
account deficits. Brazil has just begun to privatize and will offer perhaps 50
billion dollars worth of public sector companies in the next few years providing
once-off receipts for settling current account deficits. By the time privatization is
complete, foreign direct investment should become indistinguishable from local
investment.
Monetary rigor. though, is usually hard to sustain. It will be interesting to watch
what course Brazil takes. Governments traditionally find it difficult to resist the

temptation of dealing with a trade deficit by either devaluing or increasing import
tariffs. In the long run, Brazil will need to increase its exports and tighten internal
fiscal policies. This will be difficult. Brazil’s exports are just 7% of GDP which
is even lower than India for example. Brazil has a large domestic market and
historically this hinders exports.
In an attempt to deal with infrastructure problems in the transportation sector, the
government plans to auction-off the remaining public railways and encourage
private investment in some of the main roadways. Plans have been made to
Page 10

privatize Santos, South America’s largest and most ineffrcient port. It also is in the process of revising import/export
financing requirements to discourage hard-currency sales
for short-term import finance.
While long-term balance of trade strategies are at least
promising, the most difficult fiscal problem facing Brazil
will be to cut public spending even further. Roughly 80%
of federal government spending goes to wages and pensions. Some well-paid federal employees and former federal employees have
never even existed. The Brazilian constitution makes an overhaul of this system
of posthumous patronage almost impossible. There are two constitutional amendments pending that could streamline federal payroll and pension programs but
both are hopelessly bo gged down. Eventually Cardoso will have to ,oive-up
something valuable to push these through.
Government spending will have to come down if Brazil wants to avoid the pointless currency devaluation of the past. Spending restraint would permit interest
rates to fall by decreasin, u 3oovemment demand for credit. It would also increase
capital formation and local investment, the two most elusive commodities in all of
Latin America.

Brazilian
Brazilian

Energy Security
Energy

Producrion

and Dependence

on Petroleum

Sources

The Brazilian economy is heavily dependent upon diesel fuel and other petroleum
products. As a country, Brazil imports 50% of its diesel fuel. According to Dr.
Nedo Eston de Nedo of Insituto de
Pesquisas Tecnologicas, Brazil
would like to limit diesel fuel
.?
Brazil’s depende~nce
on diesel,~el:for,the~;,
I.__..) .
imports in order to lower its depentransport of freight:,in conjunctioh%ii
il-6:~~~:.
dence, however Brazil’s refineries
geographic
location-of
the oil&$
crushing -’
were built before diesel came into
industrv , and the vast distances in’$razil &Id
such high demand and the capacity
create an opportunity
for Brazil’s~~altemative
fuel industry. Brazilian~farmers
located away
doesn’t exist.
Legally, only vehicles with cargo
capacity of 1000 kilograms and

from the coast in states such as Mato Gross0
must transpbrt their fuel and protein need; frqn
the coast tind also transport their crops to
market; typically receiving $2/hag less for their

greater

soybeans.

can have diesel

engines.

Therefore, de facto, diesel-powered vehicles

are primarily

used by

Capturing

these

margik

mav::‘z.:

provide favorable conditions
for a biodiesel
processing industry in these .re60,ns.
.:‘,.,
. ..
.; ’

-,
agriculture, the military, freight
transport and mass transit. According to the Associacao NacionaI dos
Fabricantes de Veiculos Automotors, ninety percent of all intercity cargo is
shipped by diesel powered trucks and ninety percent of all passengers travel by
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diesel buses between cities. The significance of diesel
powered engines for the transport of Brazilian citizens can
be highlighted by the number of buses that are required in
key cities. Table 1 details the number of buses that operate
in the cities of Rio de Janeiro, Sao Pauio and Curitiba. By
Table
comparison, the
City of St. Louis
utilizes approximately 700 buses
and the Kansas
City Area Transportation Authority
operates 200 buses
on a daily basis.

1. Urban

transits in major

Brazilian cities.

Number of Bus ~
Companies
~

City
Rio de Janeiro

,

Number of
Buses

~

5,700

~

Sao Paul0

40

10,500

Curitiba

15

2,000
J

Alternative

Fuels Programs

Brazil’s concern with energy security became apparent in 1974 with the Middle
East oil embargo. Prior to that point in time, there is considerable debate as to the
extent of Brazil’s ener,? policy, let alone an energy security policy. As a result of
the oil embargo, Brazil launched two programs: Proalcool and Prooleo.
The Proalcool program, for Otto cycle engines, has resulted in 4 million cars
operating on 100% alcohol. However the number of vehicles operating on 100%
alcohol is on the decline. The Brazilian government no longer mandates that 50%
of all new cars produced in Brazil be powered by alcohol. As a result only one
percent of new cars sold today are designed to be powered by 100% alcohol; a
decline from 9.5% over the last decade. This fact could influence the commercialization of biodiesel and will be discussed in a later section.
The Prooleo Program, for diesel cycle engines, was also launched in the 1970’s.
Several major OEM’s participated with the program including Volkswagen,
Scania, and Mercedes. This program was canceled in the early 1980s. Technically, research conducted through this program indicated that burning unrefined
vegetable oils was not acceptable for long-term performance and vegetable oils

should be esterified.

Brazilian

Environmental

Conditions

The City of 1320Paulo provides a prime example of the conditions that exist in
Brazilian cities. Sao Paulo is truly a megacity and needs to be discussed almost as
a separate entity. With 70.000 factories and 2.2 million skilled workers, Sao
Page
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Part10 produces more wealth. as measured in industrial
GDP, than Argentina. Uruguay, Paraguay and Chile combined. Sao Paulo is a city that transacts 65% of all Latin
.4merica’s stock market activity. Motor vehicles are
responsible for 90% of a total of three million metric tons
of annual pollution. Diesel powered vehicles are a major
factor in this equation.

According to Alfred Schwarz. director of CETESB (the
Sao Paula state environmental authority), diesel powered trucks and buses (only
8.5% of all vehicles circulating in Sao Paulo) are responsible for 8 1% of NOx
emissions ,28% of the
carbon monoxide emisTable 2. Brazil’s production
of trucks and buses
sions, 30% of the particu(1994)
late matter, 77% of the
sulfur emissions, and 53%
Units
Domestic
Export
of the hydrocarbon emisProduced
Sales
sions. CETESB has the
ability to regulate which
True ks
64,137
60,722
22,816
fuels or fuel additives are
used by fleets in the city
Buses
17,435
of S2io Paulo and is a
10,313
8,284
powerful regulatory body.
As in other major Brazilian cities. lines are purchased by bus companies, but the companies have little
political control over CETESB.
Winter temperature inversions block the pollution into Sgo Paulo, like in Los
Angeles. These inversions have resulted in regulations which limit who’s allowed
to drive during daylight hours. Drivers are not allowed to drive one day a week,
according to their license plate
numbers. Recently, CETESB
Table 3. Vehicle population
in the ciiy of Sao
has become increasing strict on
Paul0
(percentage).
enforcing this regulation.
During the summer of 1997,
approximately 20 percent of
the vehicles that passed
Diesel trucks
2.4
through the city (total: 4 million daily) were not allowed to
Diesel buses
6.1
drive one day a week. The
economic

impact

of this strat-

egy could be measured against
the added cost of biodiesel
blend. CETESB has also
created other programs to
address pollution issues.

I Gasoline

motorcycles

Cars (alcohol
gasoline)

&

3.2
88.3
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PROCONVE
The greater Sao Paula area, where 30% of the 14 million
vehicles of the country circulate is a field test for
PROCONVE
- Program for Control of Air Pollution
c
caused
by
Automotive
Vehicles. This program was started
.T@p
._6
at CETESB
and was established at the federal level by
.*
‘-A.
&G..
Resolution
18, on May 6, 1986. PROCONVE
created a
plan for a gradual reduction of the emission of pollutants
by light vehicles (cars) and heavy vehicles (buses and
trucks). Following
the steps of the best programs in developed countries,
PROCONVE
adopted diversified
procedures for the feasibility
of the indusnial
know-how.
already existent, adapted for Brazilian
conditions and needs.
Three years ago, CETESB
began issuing smoke tickets, for the first time ever.
The smoke tickets are issued by Proconve inspectors and/or policemen.
It is a
5 100 on-the-spot
fine for emitting
too much smoke. How do they measure it? By
sight. If the officer savs your vehicle is smoking too much you are in violation.
In
Rio de Janeiro on the other hand, FEEMA
maintains regular sites where city buses
must stop and undergo occasional inspection including
smoke tests.
For lightstages:

duty Otto cycle engine

1. As of January 1, 1989,
OEM standard of: 24.0 g/km

(grams per kilometer) of
carbon monoxide (CO), 2.1
g/km of hydrocarbons (HC),
2.0 g/km of nitrogen oxide
(NOx), and, in low speed,
having to show a 3% CO
content. Utilitarian
vehicles
(not cars) had a longer timelimit. up to 1992 to show
these emission levels.

vehicles,

PROCONVE

Table 4. Relative
Sao Paula.

,oram/km

emission
1

three

offenders

PM

j

in the City of
CO

/

-- percentage

NOx

I

0

/

--

Cars (gas only)

~

10

Cars (gas and
ethanol)

~
I
I

o

68

16

Buses and
true ks

I

30

28

81

10

2

0
50

-.
? 1992 - In that year. the
iactories
new vehicle OEM standard:
12.0 g/km of co. 1.2 g/km
Motorcycles
of HC, 1.4 g/km of NOx, and
Other
show a 2.5% CO content in
low speed. Also in 1992.
alcohol cars had to obtain, according to CONAW4
0.15

has proposed

~
1

Resolution

3, a limit

/

0

/

3
0

I

2

I
I

0

/

0

/

of emission

of

of aldehydes.

3. 1997 - It is the last stage of the plan to be carried out. The fixed OEM certification
emission indexes are.. 2.0 g/km of CO, 0.3 g/km of HC, 0.69 g/km of NOx, and the CO
content in low speed shall reach 0.5%. For alcohol engines, the goal for 1997 for emission of aldehvdes is 0.03 grams per kilometer.
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For diesel engines the PROCONVE
plan proposed
resolutions
covering three stages to be met:

three

1. For hi,oher control of panicuiate matter (soot), in 1987 regulations on total exhaust based on cyiinder content were passed.
Basically, a mandaron, ratio between air-intake and soot exhaust.
2. In 1988, the new urban buses had to hit emission standards
for carbon gases: CO, CO2 and HC. Also. 1989 regulations required a tighter configuration on the adjustable components of injector pumps.
3. According to CONAMA
Resolution 10. on September 11, 1989. the following
emission limits for Diesel cycle engines were established for 1993 and 1995.
For 1993:
11.2 grams per kilowatt-hour
?.Xg/‘kWh of HC
18.0 g/kWh of NOx

(g&WI)

of CO

For 1995, the CO and HC indexes remained
14.3 g/kwh.

the same and the NOx limit

was lowered to

If the plan proposed by PROCONVE
is successful, by the end of the century
total volume of pollutants
emitted by vehicles into the air of the metropolitan

the
area

of S3o Paulo will be reduced by 60%. These indexes were set with the objective
of obtaining the performance today shown by the vehicles in circulation in countries like the United States and Japan. PROCONVE eventually will require the
use of the best technology

Agriculture

available

and Economic

in order for the plan to be fulfilled.

Development

in Brazil

Soybeans are a significant contributor to the economic activity in Brazil. Total
soybean production is now placed at 26.5 million metric tons (MMT) for the 1997
marketing year. Estimated planted area to soybeans in Brazil for 1997 was maintained at 11.8 million hectares. Brazil’s number one soybean-growing state for
1997 was Parana where production was placed at 6.7 MMT.
Soybean

exports

for 1997 are now estimated

at 7 million

tons; up almost

17

percent from ASA’s last estimate. High international prices for soybeans, the
removal of the value-added
tax (“Lmposto sobre Circulacao
de Mercadorias
Services”- ICMS) on soybean exports, and the ending of the tax differential

e

that
crushers had previously enjoyed on exports of soybean meal and oil, explain this
increase in soybean exports. As of April 15, 1997, over 5.5 million tons of the
1997 soybean crop had been registered for export with the Brazilian
Government’s Secretariat for Overseas Trade (SECEX).
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Because of expected record soybean exports for 1997 the
volume of Brazilian soybeans available for crushing has
been revised downward to 19 million tons. Brazil will be
required to buy record amounts of soybean oil and meal
P
from-Argentina this year. Soybean meal and soybean oil
production are now estimated at 15 million and 3.58
million tons. down almost 5 percent for both products.
Soybean meal and soybean oil export estimates have also
been lowered. reflecting the lower crush. Soybean meal
and soybean oil exports are placed at 9.6 million and 1.05 million tons, respectively. To make up for the domestic soybean shortfall, it is expected that Brazil’s
soybean import requirements will rise. To this end, the US Embassy has increased
its estimate of soybean imports from 600,000 to 1.1 million tons.
Soybean production is significant for several specific states. Soybean production
in the state of Mato Gross0 was estimated at 5.3 million tons and 2.5 million tons
in Goias. Soybean production in S5o Paulo was estimated at 1.3 million tons
based on 574,000 hectares of planted area. Yields were estimated at about 2.3 tons
per hectare. Soybean production is estimated between 530,000 and 550,000
metric tons in the state of Santa Catarina.
In addition to the significance of soybean production, other economic development activity in Brazil relates to a potential biodiesel industry. There has been a
recent agreement
by Detroit Diesel
Corporation to
manufacture
diesel engines in
Curitiba for the
North American
market. The state
of Parana is the
only region in
South America
that offers EastWest rail service
linking the Atlantic and Pacitic
Oceans. In order
to make this

transportarion
corridor attractive
to industry the
state government
has committed to
improving the other infrastructure

New Holland harvesteron a farm in Mato Grosso, Brazil
areas such as ports, airports and roads.
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The National Biodiesel Board’s responsibilities for the
Brazil test program included training of the ASA incountry managers, coordination of fuel logistics, ensuring
I
fuel quality, development of initial test protocols and
troubleshooting. In addition. the NBB provided assistance
with the public relations portion of the program as well as
providing technical assistance in meetings with potential
program cooperators and governmental regulatory agencies. Specific details of NBB’s activities in Brazil are reported in the following
sections.

Brazil Fuel Logistics
The requests for proposal for the biodiesel required for the Mercosur Project were
submitted to the four (4) NBB registered suppliers on 02 June 1997. Additional
information regarding the shipping requirements for the biodiesel to be shipped to
Brazil was provided to all bidders in this biodiesel competition on 06 June 1997.
On 16 June 1997, proposals for the biodiesel for
the Brazil portion of the
transit demonstration
were provided by two
firms, NOPEC and AEP.
The quotes were not
comparable due to AEP
not including any demurrage charges associated
with the IS0 tanks.
NOPEC’s cost per gallon
for the fuel portion of the
bids was lower than
AEP’s cost per gallon.
AEP was requested to
Texaco supplies diesel to St. Antonio and provided the fueling infrastmcprovide
the demurrage
ture for the biodisel test program in Curitiba
costs associated with the
use of the storage containers for the 14 week program. On 19 June 1997, AEP
provided the demurrage costs that had previously been omitted from its proposal.
With this additional information, NOPEC’s pricing still represented the lowest
price. Therefore NOPEC was selected to provide the biodiesel for the Brazilian
transit demonstration. The schedule required that the biodiesel be in the Brazil
ports of entry no later than 08 August 1997.
The NBB prepared the Project Order for the biodiesel to be issued by the ASA to
NOPEC. It was also agreed that the biodiesel would be shipped in 55 gallon
drums. The Brazilian customer provided their concurrence to this packaging
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change on 02 July 1997. Due to issues encountered in the
testing of the biodiesel, additional analysis was required to
ensure that the biodiesel was in compliance with the NBB
biodiesel specification. On 10 July 1997. the NBB provided NOPEC with the authorization to ship the biodiesel
to Brazil. However. due to the import license not having
been issued in Brazil. NOPEC’s freight forwarder was
advised to hold the shipment.
The NBB was advised, on 15 July 1997. by Julio Vianna, the Project Manager in
Brazil, of the contact at the Brazilian import company, Fundacao ABC, that would
be handling this shipment. In addition, the NBB was advised that all biodiesel
was to be delivered to the Port of Parangua. The direction for the delivery of the
biodiesel had previously been to the Ports of Parangua and Santos.
NOPEC provided a “Pro Forma” Invoice to its freight forwarder. This “Pro
Forma” Invoice included the necessary information according to Julio Vianna.
However, based on later discussions with Fundacao ABC, an updated “Pro
Forma” invoice template was provided to NOPEC. On 21 July 1997, NOPEC’s
freight forwarder submitted the “Pro Forma” invoice in the format requested by
Fundacao ABC.
On 28 July 1997, NOPEC’s freight forwarder was advised that the “Pro Forma”
Invoice must be in Portuguese. NOPEC
resubmitted the “Pro Forma” invoice in Portuguese on 30 July 1997. The “Pro Forma”
Invoice reflected U.S. gallons and U.S. dollars.
Per Julio Vianna, this was not acceptable to
Fundacao ABC. On 3 1 July 1997, NOPEC
provided the “Pro Forma” invoice exactly as
required - in the template requested, in Portuguese, in metric measurements, and in Brazilian currency. On 04 August 1997, Julio Vlanna
advised that he would “hand carry” the “Pro
Forma” invoice to the responsible parties in
Brazil. Julio Vianna agreed to immediately
notify Central Florida Freight Forwarders upon
any indication of issuance of the import license.
It was also requested that permission be granted

to initiatetheshipmentprior to theactual
JuIi6 Viarma Jr. and Antonio Vellozo were
project coordinators in Brazil

issuance of the import license. However, Julio
Vianna did not recommend this action be taken.

It should be noted that a ship sailed from Florida each Saturday. This required
that the biodiesel be picked up from NOPEC no later than Wednesday preceding
the ship date. The estimated shipping time is 14 days to the Port of Itajai plus 5
days (estimated) for transit to the Port of Parangua.
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NOPEC continued to work closely with its freight forwarder. Central Florida Freight Forwarders. regarding the
shipment of biodiesel to Brazil. The NBB maintained
r
constant contact with the ASA and Juli6 Vianna regarding
the status of the Brazil import license and providing
assistance as required. Finally, on 28 August 1997, the
import license was in place in Brazil. The biodiesel was
picked up from NOPEC on 03 September 1997 and
shipped from Florida on 06 September 1997.
The biodiesel for the Brazilian transit demonstration reached the Port of
Paranagua on 06 October 1997. Due to the time that was required to secure the
import license the schedule associated with the transit demonstration in Brazil had
to be revised. The transit demonstration began during the third week of December.
Bus Identification

Number

Test Protocols
for Brazilian
Sites

Company:
Address:

Make:-

Model:

-0domete; Reading:

Vehicle Weight:

No. Drive Axles:
_.
.,

No. ?ires:

‘T&e ofT$o:

,

Fuel Tank Volume

Engine Mfg:

Engine Size:

Model Year:

GVWR:

Total No. Axles:

Intercooled?

Front Tie Size:

Rear Xre Size:

Fuel Injection Pump Mfg:
No. of Seated Passengers:

The overall objective of the demonstration program
was to collect
reliable information that would
allow transit
companies and
other interested
parties to compare
the performance of
buses fueled with a
biodiesel blend to
petroleum diesel
fuel. The NBB

prepared a complete briefing book
(see appendix II) for the in-country managers and conducted a training session in
the US the first week of June, 1997. During this session, the Brazilian and Argentine managers were introduced to biodiesel’s attributes as well as considerations
for use. In addition, test procedures specific to each city were discussed. The
Brazilian test sites which were initially selected to participate with the biodiesel
program included one transit company in the city of Curitiba and four transits in
the city of S2o Paula.
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Initially. in-country managers were asked to identify a set
of buses with similar configurations and detail the specific
information for each unit. Half of those vehicles were to
be used as diesel controls. Information collected from the
buses powered with B20 (20% by volume biodiesel mixed
with 80% by volume diesel) was compared to the data
collected from the similar control buses.

Managers were also instructed on the correct mixing and fueling procedures.
Managers were instructed to take oil samples for a limited number of the project
buses on a normal schedule (actual number were deterrnined by individual company). Oil samples were sent to program partners for analysis. Professional
evaluation of oil samples can help determine if excessive wear of internal oilwetted parts is occurring. In addition, analyses such as fuel dilution, viscosity,
and total solids provides an indication of impacts of
fuel use. For example, fuel dilution of crankcase oil
Tests for Oil Samples
by unburned fuel reduces lubricant effectiveness.
The thinning of the lubricant can lead to decreased
LGscosity
lube
film strength adding to the risk of abnormal
Solids (soot)
Fuel Dilution
wear. Viscosity is the single most important propWater
erty of a lubricating oil. Viscosity measures the
Antifreezes
lubricant’s internal resistance to flow. Total solids is
We& Metals:
_A
a
measurement of the amount of fuel soot, sludge,
‘.Copper
varnish, spent additives, and other insoluble con. Iron
ChromiLim
taminants. Values from the analysis of the oils
‘.Ah.minllm
samples were compared to average values associated
-silicon
with diesel fuel use.
Lead
Tin

Fuel samples were taken by company personnel of
both the neat biodiesel and the blended biodiesel.
Initially, one sample of the neat biodiesel was taken when it was delivered to the
site. In addition, one sample was taken each month from the neat biodiesel tank.
Charts were provided for their convenience in recording the data. Fuel samples
were to be stored in a cool environment. Samples were stored in the event that an
issue arose and required the retesting of the fuel sample.
Program guidelines were developed to avoid misfueling issues with the project
buses. The diesel buses for this project were fueled as normal. As a fail-safe,
either the fuel inlets on the buses had been changed so that only biodiesel blends
could be utilized or locking gas caps had been installed. In the event that these
actions were not taken, decals were to be placed on the inside of the fueling port
access door on each biodiesel bus.
During the project test period repairs on each of the buses were monitored. Two
mechanics on each shift had the responsibility of working on buses that were part
of this project. Those individuals were designated by the project coordinators. It
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is important to have specific mechanics assigned to the
project in order to maintain continuity with repair procedures. Past projects have demonstrated that different
mechanics approach repairs in different ways. For example. one mechanic may immediately change out an
injector if serious loss of power is reported and the next
mechanic may first change out the primary and secondary
fuel filter.
Supervisors were responsible for ensuring that the specified mechanics service
and repair the buses for this project. The following types of data were collected
and summarized by the ,4SA South American project managers at the completion
of the test program:

l
l
l
l
l

Yumber of gallons of B20 added and mileage
Diesel additions and mileage
Maintenance and repairs
Oil analysis
Initial configuration information
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Curitiba

Test Program

Overview

The biodiesel program in Cuririba was conducted at Santo
Antonio, a municipal transit which operates in the Curitiba
metropolitan area. The major objectives of this test program were to demonstrate the positive environmental
attributes of biodiesel, determine the operational benefits
of biodiesel blends compared to other alternative fuels
such as compressed natural gas and to document reductions in the smoke from transit bus exhaust emissions.
Approximately 2000 buses operate in the metropolitan area of Curitiba (city and
surrounding areas). The municipal transportation office, Urbs, contracts with 15
private companies. Both the municipal government and state government have
been very active in promoting the protection of the environment. Specifically, J.
Lemer (governor of Parana) has expressed interest in examining biodiesel as a
technology to reduce emissions in this area. Passenger fares are determined by
Urbs. Contracts with the fifteen private companies are negotiated by the profit
margins that these companies receive.
The city of Curitiba is designed to accommodate the transit system. There are
five radials in the city. These radials run North, South, East, West, and Southeast.
On these radials there is a middle lane in traffic that is only for transit travel.
Twenty transfer stations are located on
these
radials and this is
Table 5. Engine inventory
for St. Antonio.
where the direct lines
are operated. From the
direct lines, many spur
routes are operated.
VW (MWM)
3

;I

I

I

Mercedes

Benz (O-37 1)

36

Mercedes

Benz (OF-l 620)

25

IVolvo

(B58E)

Mercedes
Scania
Total

I

18

I

Benz (other)

38
I

5
122

Sam0 Antonio operates 122 buses powered by a variety of
I engines. Table 5
details the type and
number of engines that
I are used by Santa
Antonio. Santa Antonio buses average

approximately 2 km/
liter. Average number of kilometers traveled each day ranges from 100 to 400
kilometers depending upon the different buses used. Some of the buses operate
on long distance direct routes while others operate on low capacity, very short
routes. Approximately 2 million people are transported by, on average, 92 buses
each month. All Santo Antonio records are compiled on a computerized data
base. Repairs, maintenance, fuel additions, oil additions, and routes are all colPage 22

lected for each bus on a daily basis. Reports can be generated by time frame, bus number. and other parameters.

Major

Partners

Success of the program in Curitiba was dependent upon
the assistance and cooperation of several companies. The
National Biodiesel Board coordinated the efforts of these
companies and provided technical assistance throughout the program.
Texaco
Santa Antonio has a ten year contract with Texaco to supply their petroleum
needs. Texaco has supplied the fueling infrastructure for Santa Antonio and will
be workins with Santa Antonio to supply the necessary infrastructure for the
biodiesel
project. CurTable 6. Specification
for diesel fuel used at St. Antonio.
rently Santo
Characteristic
Method
Specification
Unit
Antonio uses a
30,000 liter
Contaminants
%
D1796
0.05 max
primary fuel
Color
vlsooo
Pass
tankanda
15,000 liter
Cor ASTM
3.0 max
D154X
I
secondary tank.
Corrosian
and
D130
2 max
A filter is used
Cobre
between the
Density
D4052
0.82 and 0.88
Kg/L
primary and
secondary
Boiling Point
D86
e c
tanks to control
50% vol ret
245-3 10
o c
I D86
I
I
sediments, etc.
A standard
85% vol ret
D86
370 max
D c
I
I
I
dispenser (with
Sulfur
0.50 max
%
I D1552
I
I
normal
nozzles) is
CCI
45 min
D4737
being used.
Viscosity

D445

1.6-6.0

-4pproximately
76,000 liters of

Cetane
(engine)

D613

40

fuel are used
each week by

Carbon

I D524

I

0.25

I

I

I
I
I

cst

I

I

Cinzas

D482
0.02 max
%
approximately,
92 in-service
buses. One trailer of diesel fuel is delivered by Texaco every day. The diesel
delivered by Texaco to Santa Antonio does not contain an additive package.
However, Texaco does offer diesel fuel with an additive package in this market.
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Santo Antonio will supply a certificate of analysis of one of
the petroleum shipments from Texaco. There are four
grades of fuel used by the Brazilians (described as fuel
A.B.C. and D). Santo Antonio uses fuel that meets the
specifications of B. The Brazilian specification for “B”
fuel is detailed in Table 6 on page 23.
Castro1
Castro1 performs oil analysis for Santo Antonio. They have
a regular oil analysis program and were willing to test the oil samples at the
completion of the biodiesel project. The significance of oil analysis was discussed previously in the protocols section of this report.
Volvo
Volvo is a major partner in the biodiesel project. Volvo will be conducting emissions tests on a new Volvo bus engine as part of the program. It is anticipated that
Volvo will utilize a 1997 10 liter THD102KFM for this test, which is a typical bus
engine that meets Euro 1 emissions standards. Volvo will use a European 13
mode steady state test protocol. The standard criteria pollutants that will be
measured are: NOx, HC, CO, C02, and PM. They are equipped with a minidilution tunnel and
have the ability to
collect PM on
filters but not to
measure the split
between carbon
and soluble organic
fractions. Tecpar,
the state research
agency, indicated
they will perform
this function.

Tecpar
The Technical
Institute of Parana
is 57 years old and
serves as the state
research center.
They operate on a
budget of over $40
Members of the USB, ASA. and NBB meet with representatives of Volvo
million Real annually. Eighty percent
of their budget is generated from revenue streams and only 20% comes from the
state treasury.
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Certification
Technology Information
Technological Incubator

The biodiesel program will be included in the Materials Technology division.
Tecpar is directly aligned with the state government. The president of Tecpar is
the Science & Technology Minister directly under Governor Lemer. Tecpar has
an impressive lab and will be duplicating the fuel analysis. They will work in
conjunction with Petrobras on some tests such as the cetane engine test.
MO U Signing
A memorandum of understanding was signed between all participating parties in
December, 1997. The MOU stated the basis for the demonstration’s performance,
proclaimed each entities support of the project and laid out each partners basic
role and responsibility for the
various elements of the project. A
copy of the MOU is attached as
Appendix III.
Biodiesel Initial Conclusions
Valid reasons exist to consider
Brazil as an attractive target for
investment and expansion. First,
President Cardoso has succeeded in
convincing Brazil’s Congress and
the electorate to abandon the old
economic model of state control and
operation of business and public
sector services. Second, the economic plan has eliminated hyperinflation and restored a sound and
stable currency pegged to the dollar.
Third, Brazil has sophisticated
construction and construction equipment industries that are presently
underutilized. Fourth, Brazil is the
region’s largest market and one of
the world’s largest markets. Fifth,
Volvo assembly plant in Curitiba, PR, Brazil
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region’s lar,oest market and one of the world’s largest
markers. Fifth. financing for US participation is possible
from various sources.
I

Furthermore. opportunities also exist in Brazil for
biodiesel. Brazil currently has a municipal rule (now
extending across the nation according to one transit), that
5% of the bus purchases by transits must be CNG by the
year 2000. This regulation may offer the opportunity to
showcase biodiesel. Dr. Nedo Eston de Nedo, a Prooleo pioneer, says urban
uansit is the best way to reintroduce biodiesel to Brazil. The urban bus sector
represents the intersection of national energy security interests, air quality, regulations, economic development and lots of media attention. Economically,
biodiesel blends compete well against other alternative such as compressed
natural sas in this transportation sector.
Government fleets represent another major transportation sector in Brazil. However due to the statute limiting diesel engines to vehicles with cargo capacity of
1,000 kilos or greater, government fleets in general are not a significant opportunity for biodiesel.
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SEo Paulo Test Program Overview

r

The biodiesel program in Sao Pauio was to involve four
separate bus companies. The major objectives of the test
program was to determine the operational benefits of
biodiesel blends compared to other alternative fuels such
as compressed natural gas and to document reductions in
smoke from transit bus exhaust emissions by the use of
opacity readings.

SZo Paulo Transportation has approximately 10,500 buses operating within the
city of Sao Paulo and the surrounding areas. Approximately 7% of those buses
are operated by Penha Sao Miguel (PSM). Sgo Paulo Transportation contracts
with forty private companies to operate the routes in the city. The forty private
companies have organized themselves into an organization to negotiate with the
city of S&o Paulo. This group is called Transurb and Mauricio Lourenco de
Cunha (the owner of PSM) is currently the president. Transportation within the
city of Sao Paulo is accomplished primarily by transit buses. Rates charged for
the members of Transurb are set by Sao Paul0 Transportation. The city does have
a train that operates through the center of the city, however there are no spurs on
this line. Essentially all of the buses that operate in SZo Pat110are diesel powered.
According to one article in the newspaper there are currently 133 CNG powered
buses. However, this number is supposed to increase to 753 by the end of 1997
due to a law that exists in Sso Paulo.
The four companies that were to utilize a biodiesel blend were:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Penha Sao Miguel
Talgo
Saint Brigida
Bola Branca

PENHA SAN MIGUEL
Penha San Miguel (PSM) operates 732 buses. All of the buses are powered by six
liter, direct injected, Mercedes Benz engines which range from MY88 to MY96
These engines are not electronic and make use of in-line injection pumps. Buses
travel, on average 1600 km/week and obtain 2.5 km/liter of fuel. Fuel composes
10% to 12% of their annual operatin g budget and salaries/fringes 60% to 65%.

The buses are 12.7 meters in length and can seat48 passengers.Fueling infrastructure at PSM consists of one (1) 150,000 liter primarily tank and one (1)
15,000 liter secondary tank. A filter has been installed between the primary and
secondary tank to ensure that sediment, etc. is removed.
TALGO
Talgo operates 276 buses. All of the buses are powered by 6 liter, direct injected,
Mercedes Benz engines which range from MY88 to MY96. These engines are
not electronic and make use of in-line injection pumps.
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SAINT BRIGIDA
Saint Brigida operates 383 buses. These buses are powered by either MWM or Mercedes Benz engines. All
engines are 6 liter, direct-injected, mechanical engines.
The Mercedes engines range from MY90 to MY97 and the
MWM engines are either MY94, MY95, or MY97.

Issues in SGo Paulo:

The test program in SZo Paulo was not initiated due to regulatory issues affecting
the legal status of the fuel in Sao Paulo. In addition. other factors also surfaced
which will be discussed in the following section.
CETESB
As detailed in the previous sections, CETESB is the S2o Paulo state environmental authority. CETESB has the ability to regulate which fuels or fuel additives are
used by fleets in the city of Sao Paulo. This organization was not convinced that a
biodiesel in-field test should be allowed because biodiesel was not a legally
registered fuel. NBB had raised the issue of the fuel’s legal status in South
American prior to initiation of the biodiesel project. This and other regulatory
issues remain open and should be resolved prior to any further activity in Brazil.
A meeting was held in August, 1997 with CETESB. CETESB engineers requested technical information and attempted to locate holes in the technical
repository of information concerning biodiesel. Essentially all questions were
answered, however CETESB did not want to allow the initiation of the project
prior to laboratory testing in the state of SZo Paulo. They indicated several reasons for this recommendation:
l

.
l
l

Buses operate under different load conditions
Brazilian buses mainly utilize 6 liter engines instead engines which are over 9
liters as in the US
Diesel in Brazil is dramatically different from diesel in the US
The “proper” place to start testin g was in their state operated lab, IPT

These justifications were addressed by the NBB during the meeting. Specifically,
CETESB engineers were asked about why load conditions would be that much
different from US conditions and why they would dramatically alter emissions
and/or performance. CETESB acknowledged that differences would probably be
slight at best. In addition, it was noted that US and European laboratories have
tested engines that are very similar or the same as engines utilized in Brazil.
Although it was agreed that testing should occur in the laboratory prior to large
and expensive in-field tests, NBB stated that it was the hope of the US soybean
farmers that their counterparts would be able to utilize existing laboratory data in
order to avoid duplication of efforts.
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It was agreed. however that Brazilian diesel fuel was much
different than US onroad diesel fuel and that results could
be different. CETESB insisted that a 100 hour engine test
be performed prior to project initiation. It was also indicated that costs associated with engine procurement and
testing would be the responsibility of someone besides the
state.

Alcohol Industrv
In order to better understand the relationship between sugar cane alcohol producers and the biodiesel industry, a meeting was scheduled with SOPRAL in December, 1997. SOPRAL (sociedade de producers de acucar e de alcohol) is an organization representing 19% (40 of 212) of the alcohol producers in Brazil. SOPRAL
has 55 members of which 40 are producers. Their producers range in size from
300,000 tons to 3 million tons of annual production.
There were two major outcomes of this initial interaction. First, SOPRAL has
indicated that they no longer view biodiesel has competition to their efforts.
Second SOPRAL would like to discuss the potential of conducting joint research
on the use of biodiesel and ethanol together in combination with diesel fuel.
Although both of these points should be considered as positive outcomes, caution
is recommended as to the levels of support to expect from alcohol producers in
Brazil. Consider the market outlook for alcohol producers. Brazil has had an
alcohol program since 1975. Over the past decade about 95% of the cars that
were produced and sold in Brazil were able to operate on 100% ethanol. At the
present, only 1% of cars produced and sold are able to operate on ElOO. In
addition, diesel cars are not sold in Brazil. Legally, only heavy duty vehicles are
diesel powered. Therefore, the market in the light duty vehicle market appears to
be limited unless more cars are produced to operate on ElOO. It is not unreasonable to expect that ethanol producers will continue to look at the diesel market as
a way to maintain and potentially increase the demand for alcohol in Brazil.
Specifically, alcohol producers are looking at the transit segment as the market
that can create inroads into the traditional diesel market. There are two major
themes; treat alcohol as a fuel and operate the buses on El00 or treat alcohol as
an additive and try to mix alcohol with diesel fuel. The alcohol producers are
split on this issue. SOPRAL is supportive of utilizing alcohol as a fuel, not an
additive. SOPRAL has become the flagship for this position. Also, OEM’s do not
necessarily support the concept of mixing alcohol and diesel fuel. There are
several unanswered research questions associated with this concept.
Essentially, the biodiesel industry should not necessarily expect the ethanol
producers to provide unconditional support. Unless the alcohol producers are able
to increase a) the % of alcohol in the gas mix or b) number of El00 cars produced, they will continue to look to the diesel market as a new marketing opportuPage 29

niry. However there are opportunities to work together in
developing the biofuels industry in Brazil.
Move Toward Lioht Rail and Metro
According to Raul V. Bravo & Associates, in Sao Paula
the operators of both Metro and Commuter services have
very ambitious plans in advanced stages of development.
These plans include adding new metro lines in several
areas of the city.

Biodiesel Initial Conclusions
The biodiesel program in ,520 Pat110will need additional effort to resolve the
regulatory, political and market competition issues. Upon resolution of those
issues, similar conclusions can be drawn for SZo Paulo as those for the city of
Curitiba. There are at least two issues/concepts which could help bring the
alcohol and biodiesel industries together in developing the biofuels industry.
First, renewal of the fuel subsidy program in Brazil could provide an opportunity
for sugar cane and soybean farmers to work together to achieve a beneficial
program for biofuels. Within the next three years, Brazil will revise the levels of
subsidies for diesel fuel and alcohol. The alcohol industry is in the process of
determining what position they want to promote. Adding biodiesel support from
Brazilian soybean producers could create a formidable lobby in this effort.
Second, technologies are currently available which utilize both ethanol and
biodiesel. Fosseen Manufacturing & Development (FMD) has patented an ethanol fumigation system which could utilize a biodiesel blend and fumigate ethanol
into the combustion system during peak demand periods. This information could
be forwarded to SOPRAL as an indication of support and potential collaboration.
One needs to understand that the FMD technology, however, does not require the
use of a biodiesel blend. The technology was originally designed to operate with
diesel and ethanol only. In addition, other joint research programs on ethanol/
biodieseVdiese1 blends could also be pursued.
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anti-inflation
to survive.

Argentina’s 1990s defeat of hyperinflation and re-emergence as a functional stable country has been one of the
economic success stories of the twentieth century. Although President Carlos Menem recently fired the architect
of this success, economic minister Domingo Cavallo, his
collaboration will bring positive economic benefits to
Argentina and most Argentines for a long time to come.
The Peronist party is probably very close to fragmentation
and Menem is no longer assured of re-election. but the
program has already been severely tested and appears strong enough

The test came from a surprising source. Of all countries in Latin America, Argentina was the most seriously affected by the Mexican currency collapse in December of 1994. Three years of swift growth and privatization came to an abrupt halt
in 1995, as banks folded, $8 billion in deposits fled the country and President
Menem deflated the economy to preserve Cavallo’s program. This program, pure
and simple, was to fix the value of the peso at parity with the dollar and to restrict
the domestic money supply to the level of foreign exchange reserves. This meant
virtually no deficit spending. Menem was able to salvage price stability and
weather the crisis but the cost was surprisingly stiff, a 4.4% drop in gross domestic product (GDP) and 17% unemployment.
The program worked and Argentina’s recovery in 1996 surprised even the critics.
The ministry of economics revised 1997’s growth forecast upwards from 5% to
6%. Similar growth is likely this year. Moreover, the recovery (in contrast to the
consumer boom of 1991 - 1994) is led by investment and exports. Investors have
become more confident as ‘convertibility’ has outlasted not only the 1995 recession but also the firing of Cavallo. Those businesses that have survived trade
liberalization and the ending of subsidies are now tough and competitive.
Sweeping privatization and a wave of investment, both foreign and local, have
modernized old industries and nourished new ones. Despite a drought, Argentina
farmers produced a record feed-grain and oilseeds harvest last year. Argentine
agriculture is changing to the California model, with high-end, specialty crops
replacing raw commodities for export as the domestic and Mercosur market
expands. Privatization and a new mining and mineral code has stimulated foreign
investment in this once dormant sector. Mining firms expect exports, led by
copper and gold, to grow from $30 million last year to $1.8 billion by the year
2000. Oil and gas output has doubled, YPF (the former state petroleum monopoly) has begun buying up strategic foreign companies and Mercosur has
created a boom in Argentine manufactured cars exported to Brazil.
But the fact remains that perhaps as much as a third of the work force is excluded
from the new prosperity. This frustration has caused waves of protest in the
interior as well as made Argentina’s middle class very nervous about the future of
public education, health care, and social services. The unemployment is probably
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due to both the tightness of money from the December
1994 currency crisis and the structural changes caused by
the resultant recession. Employers had been slimming
their workforce to face increasing competition within
Mercosur at the same time that the government had been
rampantly privatizing which meant more slimming and
cutting of state payrolls. The joint result was high unemployment.
Because of unemployment, Menem’s Peronist party will probably lose its majority in the lower house of Congress. The peronists are now hopelessly divided but
so is the opposition. In any event, an opposition victory would probably not undo
the price stability program or the fixed exchange rate. The opposition would
probably not try to change Argentina’s economic policy, but instead, focus on the
unchanged aspect of Argentina’s remaining institutions. The Menem government
has come to a standstill with respect to the final phase of privatization and has yet
to deal effectively with the still powerful Peronist unions. The delivery of health,
education and social services needs to be made more efficient. The entry of new
workers into the workforce needs to be made less expensive for employers and
layoffs need to be accepted by the unions as a necessary tool to maintain competitiveness within Mercosur.
And finally, perhaps the most serious problem of all is still the systematic corruption that prevents a lot of public sector money from reaching its intended purpose.
The politicized judiciary has done nothing to crack down on routine tax evasion
or misuse of public funds. While these problems are in no way unique to Argentina they are, in this case, blocking the final stages of an otherwise miraculous
economic transformation.

L4rgentine Energy Security
Argentine Energy Production and Dependence on Petroleum Sources
As detailed in an INTA (Institute National de Tecnologia Agropecuaria) report
prepared in July, 1996, the significant increase in the consumption of petroleum
liquid fuels is the consequence of the strong economic growth that began with the
Convertibility Plan in March, 199 1. Today, the situation differs significantly from
that which existed prior to 1991. A discussion of YPF tells the whole story.
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) is the former state monopoly oil company. Privatized in 1993, YPF has almost become a symbol of market forces
working effectively for the restructuring of a noncompetitive state-owned com-

pany. Prior to this change, YPF operated in a regulated market. In the first two
years after privatization, the workforce at YPF was slashed from more than
50,000 to 6,750, and extraneous assetssuch as movie theaters, railroads and
hospitals were sold off for additional working capital. Deficit-ridden throughout
its entire existence, in 1995 YPF netted $800 million dollars which was double
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the previous year. Investors were so enthusiastic that
YPF’s S3 billion initial public offering, the largest in the
history of the New York Stock Exchange, was oversubscribed by 40% and YPF’s ADRs rose 47% over the next
two years. While YPF is only the 11th largest oil company
in the world in terms of stock market capitalization, it
holds approximately 50% of all the proven oil and gas
reserves in Argentina and Argentina’s costal waters.
Since mid-1995 YPF has begun to tackle the requirements of a major oil company
doing business on a global scale. This has meant acquisitions to increase refining
and marketing capacity. While acquiring foreign companies YPF’s capital to debt
ratio has slipped from 16% to 38% which places it about average for a second-tier
integrated oil company. Since YPF operated only in Argentina for decades it will
have to acquire to expand. YPF wants to participate in the coming privatization
of state-owned oil companies in Bolivia and Peru. Analysts contend that YPF has
a definite competitive advantage in both those countries. “They’ve demonstrated
that they know how to operate in that kind of environment and there are very few
companies that have that type of expertise and are indigenous to Latin America,”
says Vinod Seghal of Oppenheimer.
Some analysts contend that the biggest challenge for YPF is in downstream
production. And while currently producing at 450,000 barrels a day, refining and

YPF Facility in Argentina

processing capacity is much less than that. It will be hard to match the efficiency
of refineries in the northern hemisphere. Shell has 1,035 gas stations in Argentina
and Exxon has 935. But YPF is working on the problem. Before privatization,
YPF owned very few of the gas stations in Argentina and could not control the
quality or distribution of its products. YPF today owns 2,600 gas stations
throughout the country and plans to build 600 “state of the art” stations by the end
of 1997.
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Demand for petroleum based fuels in Argentina has been
1
steadily increasing. Demand for special gasoline is growing at an annual accrued rate of 16%. mainly due to the
i
increased number of vehicles. The demand for diesel is
also growing, approximately 10% in the last three years.
The increase in demand for diesel is attributed to the
increased number of diesel powered vehicles for transportation and freight. Seventy percent of the fuel consumed in
the freight transportation sector is diesel fuel. Total demand within the farming sector for diesel fuel is 35%.
There has been almost no penetration of diesel fuel in the private automotive
sector due to a pricing policy followed by car makers according to the 1996 INTA
report. Diesel vehicles have always had a sufficiently high price to discourage its
purchase in lieu of gasoline powered cars. Taxis were the one sector that purchased diesel powered vehicles, however with the introduction of CNG into the
marketplace, diesel powered vehicles are also losing market share in this sector.
h-r 1996, it was estimated that 40,000 taxis were powered by compressed natural
gas.
Alternative Fuels in Argentina
The compressed natural gas industry has been steadily growing over the past two
decades in Argentina. Consumption of compressed natural gas in 1996 was 600
million m3/year, with an exponential growth that started at one million m3 in 1985.
The yearly growth rate of CNG use is close to 30%, however this annual growth
is declining. Consumption for the year 2005 is projected between 1298 and 1863
million m3/year, but still only 3% of total fuel demand for Argentina.
Diesel fuel, on the other hand, had a 8% growth rate between 1993 and 1995 due
to the large increase in diesel powered vehicles. Diesel fuel demand in 1996 was
8.9 million m3/year. Forecasts for 2005 demand are between 9.7 and 10.2 million
m3/year.
YPF also produces and distributes natural gas. Over the next ten years, natural
gas production
should reach 5.3
Table 7. Annual growth
rates for selected
fuels.
billion cubic feet
per day, two
1990- 1993
Variables
197c- 1993
1980- 1993
thirds of which
Diesel conumption
3.34
2.38
8.07
will be consumed domestiCNG consumption
89.07
39.48
tally and one
8.04
-1.89
-9.60
Diesel price
third exported.
CNG

price

Source:
1996

Characterization

-1.96
of the Argentine

-0.64

7.17

Liquid Fuel Sector,
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ln 1996, YPF’s natural gas exports exceeded $1.8 billion
and are expected to grow by another SZOOmillion this year.
Future gas exports will be assured by a YPF-led
consortium’s plans to build a gas pipeline linking fields in
southern Argentina with Chile. YPF is also expected to
begin exporting natural gas to Brazil by the year 2000 if
gas fields currently under exploration in northwestern
Argentina prove to have sufficient reserves. Potential sales
to Brazil are estimated at $600 million per year.

Argentina has no comparable legislation LOthe US Energy Policy ilct. Argentina
is fast becoming a major producer/exporter of traditional energy sources including
electricity. YPF has very close ties to the government-run, but soon to be privatized, National Institute of Industrial Technology (ANTI) which has overseen ail of
Argentina’s experiments with alternative fuels except nuclear fuels. Dr. Carlos
Lomo, Director of the Transportation Fuels Division, notes a few developments in
recent years which highlight the movement toward alternative fuels such as CNG.
Argentina already prides itself on its acquisition of CNG vehicles and operates
more CNG vehicles than all the rest of Latin America combined. YPF plans to
equip a third of its’ new gas stations with compressors and CNG fast-fill technologies. CNG is viewed as the alternative fuel of the Argentina’s future for a number
of reasons. As soon as North American and European OEMs develop competitively priced CNG vehicles, the government plans on favoring this market through
tax-based incentives. The more CNG consumed domestically, the more downstream petroleum products can be exported. Refined petroleum products for
export are viewed as a major taxable foreign exchange earner, the necessary
prerequisite for expansion of the domestic money supply. Many CNG joint
ventures are currently under negotiation in Argentina, including the manufacture
of heavy-duty CNG engines with Detroit Diesel Corporation (DDC), Cummins
and Navistar.

Argentine

Environmental

Conditions

Most federal environmental legislation in Argentina focuses on water and soil
erosion issues and not on ‘green’ issues like air pollution. Review of the federal
codes and the Buenos Aires municipal codes produced only older vehicle restrictions and the world famous Buenos Aires smoke and noise ‘ticket’ section. It is

possible that politically, air pollution is viewed as an OEM solvable issue that
economic prosperity will take care of it as newer vehicles are purchased and
phased into service. There is historical precedent for this line of thought. Twice
during its history, Argentina has ‘modernized’ overnight when political stability
and economic prosperity have attracted both local and foreign investment at the
same time. Many observers to the current scene feel that this is what is happening
today.
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According to a 1996 INTA report, the Argentine edible oil
sector is one of the country’s most important industries. It
is responsible for 23% of foreign exchange earnings from
exports, equivalent to $5.14 billion. The farming and beef
sectors account for 60% of the total foreign exchange from
exports. Argentina’s comparative advantage as a producing and exporting country of agricultural commodities has been greatly developed
by the edible oil industry, positioning Argentina as one of the leading exporters of
the oilseeds complex as a whole, including both soybean and sunflower byproducts.
Almost 85% of all crushing of soybeans takes place in the province of Santa Fe.
The oilseed crushing industry has undergone a rapid expansion in the last ten
years, resulting in greater capacity and modem facilities. Both local and intemational investors have been attracted, especially to the province of Santa Fe’s.
Vegetable oil refining, dairy products and cattle slaughter alone come to 34% of
the province’s GDP. Agricultural machinery, equipment and parts come to an
additional 13%. None of this takes into account the actual value of the crops
grown. Santa Fe produces 65% of the nation’s soyoil exports and 26% of the
sunflower oil exports. The province of Cordoba also derives 30% of it’s GDP
from processing vegetable oil.
The edible oil industry has been developing according to the increases in hectares
planted and harvested for soybeans and sunflowers. Similar to the United States,
soybean development is a recent historical event. Since the 1970’s Argentina’s
soybean crop has been steadily increasing. The 1990/91 Argentine soybean crop
was 3.77 million metric tons (1,925 million hectares planted). In 1995, 5.7
million hectares were planted and the resulting crop was 12.5 million metric tons.
The province of Santa Fe is the leading soybean production area, followed by
Buenos Aires and Cordoba.
As with every other sector of the Argentine economy in the 1990s competitiveness has resulted in the closing of many of the smaller (less than l,OOO/mt/day
capacity) plants.
Overall, the
Table 8. Argentine
Provinces
in order of area planted to
crushing industry’s
soybeans.
growth will conProvince
hectares
metric tons
% of total area
tinue to shift
Argentina away
Santa Fe
2.6 million
46
5.606.900
I
I from raw material
exports and toward
Cordoba
1 .9 million
2,658,700
22
making component products.
Buenos Aires
1 .4 million
2.698.200
22
The laws creating
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export taxes on raw commodities in the 1980s and early
1990s helped to initiate this trend. Raw commodities are
P
still heavily taxed, although debate is considerable on how
I
effective this policy really is. Most companies exporting
soybeans from Argentina are the vertically integrated
multinationals that transfer the bulk of their commodities
internally. AGsfar as the crushing industry is concerned, the
export tax on oil and meal is virtually non-existent. There
is an export tax but it is almost entirely rebated. On the oil
there is an export tax of 3.5% with a rebate of 1.5% on crude and 3.15% on
refined. These developments, plus improveTable 9. Total crushing capacity
in Argentina.
ments in the transportation infrastructure,
By Province,
CY1996
open the future possiLocation
Number
of Plcnts T Daily Capccity
bility of pulling-in raw
Buenos Aires
16
15.05
I
I materials from other
I
countries for processing, shifting regional
5.34
Fed. Capital
8
trade patterns somewhat. Small quantities
Santa Fe
18
34.19
of soybeans are already
Others
10
I
2.92
entering the country,
which could increase if
Total
58
63.99
I
price relationships
Source:
JJ Hinrichsen
S.A., 1997 Annual Repot-t
became favorable. But
make no mistake,
Argentina retains very little soybean oil for domestic consumption. Almost the
entire crush (94 percent in 1995) is exported to Brazil in it’s unrefined form.
.bgentina exports more than 1 million metric tons of soybean oil annually. The
vegetable oil of preference for domestic consumption is sunflower seed oil. The
Province of Buenos Aires produces 60 percent of Argentina’s sunflower crop, a
total of 3.26 million metric tons.

1
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The National Biodiesel Board’s responsibilities for the
Brazil test program included training of the ASA incountry managers, coordination of fuel logistics, ensuring
fuel quality, development of initial test protocols and
troubleshooting. In addition, the NBB provided assistance
with the public relations portion of the program as well as
providing technical assistance in meetings with potential
program cooperators and governmental regulatory agencies. Specific details of NBB’s activities are reported in
the following

Argentine

sections.

Fuel Logistics

On 21 Julv 1997, the American Soybean Association requested that the NBB
provide a.n estimated price for 20,000 gallons of biodiesel and the associated
shipping charges for the Argentine portion of the transit demonstration. However,
several of the details regarding the Argentine portion of the South American
transit demonstration had yet to be provided prior to the actual procurement of the
biodiesel being formalized.
Ln early September, the remaining details of the Argentine transit demonstration
were provided. NOPEC was asked to maintain its same price for the biodiesel for
Argentina as was paid for the biodiesel for Brazil. NOPEC agreed to honor this
price. Accordingly, on 11 September 1997, the NBB, on behalf of the ASA,
authorized NOPEC to proceed with the production of soy-based biodiesel. Shortly
thereafter, the NBB issued a Project Order to NOPEC on behalf of the ASA for
10,010 gallons of biodiesel to arrive at the point of entry Buenos Aires, Argentina
by 17 October 1997.
On 17 September 1997, NOPEC notified the NBB that they were unable to
purchase soybean oil at the price that comprised its original biodiesel price of
$3.19 per gallon in time to meet the required schedule. Therefore, it would be
necessary for NOPEC to purchase the soybean oil at substantially increased price
to achieve the required delivery schedule. Attempts were made by the NBB to
find another source of soybean oil for NOPEC to no avail. The NBB notified the
ASA of this situation and was advised to proceed as required to ensure the
biodiesel was available in Buenos Aires by mid October 1997.
NOPEC was told to proceed with the purchase of the soybean oil and that the
higher price for the biodiesel would be recognized by the ASA in order to protect
the transit demonstration schedule in Argentina. However, when NOPEC was
notified of this direction, they advised that it was not possible for them to obtain
the soybean oil at any price in tune to meet the shipment date of 06 October 1997.
Therefore, AEP, advised that they could provide the biodiesel in time to meet the
necessary shipment date. However, the price for the biodiesel, inclusive of the
required testing, was $4.06 per gallon. This price reflects a reduction in price of
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12 cents per gallon based on the NBB’s negotiations with
AEP. In addition, the shipping costs were higher due to
the additional interstate transportation required from
AEP’s facility in Sergeant Bluff, IA to Miami, FL. The
ASA was contacted by the NBB and secured its approval
prior to proceeding with the biodiesel purchase from AEP.
AEP was authorized to proceed on the production of
10,000 gallons of biodiesel on 19 September 1997.

It should be noted that AEP didn’t handle any of the shipping requirements.
Therefore, ail the shipping arrangements for the Argentine biodiesel were handled
by the NBB. Due to the payment terms associated with the shipping and handling
charges, the hiB made payments on behalf of the ASA and was later reimbursed
by the ASA for these charges.
Based on the efforts of AEP the biodiesel was produced and containerized by 01
October 1997. Due to trucking problems, half of the biodiesel was picked up
from AEP’s packing company in Gram Valley, MO on 02 October 1997. This
shipment departed Miami on 06 October 1997 and arrived in Buenos Aires,
Argentina on 24 October 1997. The remaining fuel was picked up on 07 October
1997 and departed Miami on 13 October 1997. This shipment arrived in Buenos
Aires, Argentina on 30 October 1997. It should be noted that based on the originai schedule, the transit demonstration in Argentina was to begin the last week in
October. The NBB took all the necessary actions to ensure that this schedule
could be achieved. The biodiesel was available in Buenos Aires, Argentina the
last week of October as instructed by the ASA. The transit demonstrations began
the second week of December.

Test Protocols for Argentine

Site

The overall objective of the demonstration program was to collect reliable information that would allow transit companies and other interested parties to compare
the performance of buses fueled with a biodiesel blend to petroleum diesel fuel.
The NBB prepared a complete briefing book (see appendix rr) for the in-country
managers and conducted a training session in the US the first week of June, 1997.
During this session, the Brazilian and Argentine managers were introduced to
biodiesel’s attributes as well as considerations for use. Ln addition, test procedures specific to each city were discussed. The Argentine test sites which were

initially selected to participate with the biodiesel program included two transit
companies in the city of Buenos Aires.
Initially, in-country managers were asked to identify a set of buses with similar
configurations and detail the specific information for each unit. Half of those
vehicles were to be used as diesel controls. Information collected from the buses
powered with B20 (20% by volume biodiesel mixed with 80% by volume diesel)
was compared to the data collected from the similar control buses.
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Managers were also instructed on the correct mixing and
fueling procedures. Managers were instructed to take oil
samples for a limited number of the project buses on a
normal schedule (actual number were determined by
individual company). Oil samples were sent to program
partners for analysis.
Professional evaluation of oil samples can help determine
if excessive wear of internal oil-wetted parts is occurring. In addition, analyses
such as fuel dilution, viscosity, and total solids provides an indication of impacts
of fuel use. For example, fuel dilution of crankcase oil by unburned fuel reduces
lubricant effectiveness. The thinning of the lubricant can lead to decreased lube
film strength adding to the risk of abnormal wear. viscosity is the single most
important property of
a lubricating oil.
Viscosity measures
Bus Identikation
Number
./
the lubricant’s interCompany:
,
nal resistance to flow.
Total solids is a
measurement of the
amount of fuel soot,
(
sludge, varnish, spent
Model:
additives, and other
Weigh:
insoluble contaminants. Values from
the analysis of the
oils samples were
compared to average
values associated
with diesel fuel use.
TogI +.&des:,
i
Front T& Size:

;-.

,I -I
. ,_ . .,

~~a:l;teicooled?
.*a+
‘..”
Rear Xre Size:

Fuel samples were
taken by company
personnel of both the
Fuel Injection Pump 6Ifg: _
neat biodiesel and the
No. of ‘seated Passengek:
blended biodiesel.
Initially, one sample
of the neat biodiesel
was taken when it was delivered to the site. In addition, one sample was taken
each month from the neat biodiesel tank. Charts were provided for their convenience in recording the data. Fuel samples were to be stored in a cool environment. Samples were stored in the event that an issue arose and required the
retesting of the fuel sample.
Program guidelines were developed to avoid misfueling issues with the project
buses. The diesel buses for this project were fueled as normal. As a fail-safe,
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either the fuel inlets on the buses had been changed so that
only biodiesel blends could be utilized or locking gas caps
had been installed. In the event that these actions were not
taken, decals were to be placed on the inside of the fueling
port access door on each biodiesel bus.
During the project test period repairs on each of the buses
were monitored. Two mechanics on each shift had
the responsibility of working on buses that were part
of this project. Those individuals were designated
Tests for Oil Samples
by the project coordinators. It is important to have
Viscosity
specific mechanics assigned to the project in order
Solids (soot)
to maintain continuity with repair procedures. Past
Fuel Dilution
projects have demonstrated that different mechanics
Water
approach repairs in different ways. For example,
Antifreeze
one
mechanic may immediately change out an
Wear Metals:
injector if serious loss of power is reported and the
Comer
“.
Iron
next mechanic may first change out the primary and
cllromil&:
.
secondary fuel filter.
Mumjnm
-“i
:

sficon ;

r.

Supervisors were responsible for ensuring that the
specified mechanics service and repair the buses for
this project. The following types of data were
collected and summarized by the ASA South American project managers at the completion of the test program:
l
l
l
l
l

Number of gallons of B20 added and mileage
Diesel additions and mileage
Maintenance and repairs
Oil analysis
Initial configuration information
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Buenos Aires Test Program Overview
The biodiesel program in Argentina was to be conducted

in at least two cities (Buenos Aires and Rosario) and
potentially a third site (Mendoza). The major objectives of
these test programs were to demonstrate the positive
economic
and environmental attributes of biodiesel and to
..
document reductions in the smoke from transit bus exhaust
emissions. Before initiation of the test program, ASA
management determined to conduct the demonstration only in the city of Buenos
Aires.
r

San Vicente is one of the largest transits in Buenos Aires

There are over 10,000 buses in Buenos Aires. Concessions are offered on a ten
year basis, with the potential for renewal if there are no negatives recorded against
that specific transit company. Two major bus companies are participating with
the biodiesel program in Buenos Aires:

E. San Vicente

.

E. San Vicente

l

Nuevos Rumbos

has approximately

260 buses and is the third largest fleet in

Buenos Aires. It is one of the most important companies in the City of Buenos
Aires. Their main office and facilities are in burzaco, near Capital Federal, in the
south urban zone of the Great Buenos Aires. All of the buses are owned by San
Vicente. Many bus companies in Argentina are cooperatives. Buses operate
under one company name, but they are owned by differed individuals. Forty
people own San Vicente, all of who work at the company. Eighty percent of the
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people that work at San Vicente are shareholders.
Buses in this fleet are powered by either Mercedes Benz or
Deutz engines (see table IO). All engines are mechanically
injected. All of the Deutz engines (77 engines) are between MY93 and MY95. Four of the Deutz engines are
naturally aspirated and the remaining Deutz engines are
turbocharged. The Mercedes Benz engines range back to
MY83. The manager of San Vicente prefers the Mercedes
Benz engines, specifically modeis 1320 and
1420. For this program,
40 buses will be assigned. Twenty buses
will be operated on B20
and the remaining 20
buses will serve as
diesel controls (determined by the San
Vicente manger).
San Vicente has experimented with oxidation
catalysts. This technology failed in their tests
due to clogged catalysts
and no long term durability. Similar to the
Brazilian information,

Table

10. Engine

Engine

inventory

for San Vicente.

Manufacturer

Number

of Buses
94

-1

1

25

I

Benz 13 14

I

12

I

Mercedes

Benz 13 15

I

2

I

Mercedes

Benz 1316

I

4

I

Mercedes

Benz 1319

I

4

I

Mercedes

Benz 1114

I

Mercedes

Benz 1214

Mercedes

Deutz T
Total

73
242

Typical urban bus at San Vicente busline

Page 43

fuel expenses account for about 10% of the operating
budget of the transit. Esso is the fuel distributor for San
Vicente. No additives are in the diesel fuel purchased by
San Vicente. One half of the buses are fueled during the
day and one half at night. Diesel fuel is stored in six
underground tanks.
San Vicente is currently using 27,000 liters a day and their
buses are average 2.5 km/liter. Approximately 25,000 to
30,000 liters of fuel is delivered every day. San Vicente has an annual contract
with Esso, this year for 32.5c/liter. They have, however, been using Esso for a
number of years even though the contract renews yearly.
Nuevos Rumbos is a medium sized company that operates in Capital Federal.
Their main office and facilities are located in Capital Federal. They are known as
a very effkient and innovative company. Their bus fleet is equipped with late
model engines. Similar to San Vicente, 40 buses will be assigned to the test.
Twenty buses will be operated on B20 and the remaining 20 buses will serve as
diesel controls.

Major Partners
Success of the program in Buenos Aires was dependent upon the assistance and
cooperation of several companies. The National Biodiesel Board coordinated the
efforts of these comparues and provided technithe program.

MO U Signing
Amemorandumof
understanding was signed
I
between all participating
parties in December, 1997.
The MOU stated he basis
for the demonsfiation’s
performance, proclaimed
each entities support of the
project and laid out each
partners basic role and
responsibility for the various elements of the project.
A copy of the MOU is
attached as Appendix III.

.- ...i!

Employee of Nuevos Rumbos busline taking an
opacity reading from a diesel powered bus
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Biodiesel Initial Conclusions
The primary market drivers for biodiesel commercialization in Argentina appear to be different from those experienced in Curitiba, Brazil. The compulsion to create
biodiesel markets is generally founded on one or more of
the following elements: economic development; environmental improvement; and/or energy security. Of these
factors, only economic development
seems to be of
interest to potential
Argentine industry
stakeholders.
In the Argentine case,
if the environmental
agencies begin
enforcement of
pollution limits then
biodiesel blends will
compete with compressed natural gas.
Doug Magnus speaks at the signing of the MOU
If the agencies do not
enforce emissions
legislation then biodiesel blends will compete with the diesel fuel market. Given
the strong level of interest from the agricultural industry, consideration should be
given to including biodiesel into the petroleum infrastructure in low levels. This
concept could be sold on the aspects of economic development by a strong agricultural contingent.
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